Ben's News

Thursday, May 11, 2006

Microsoft Sees Future as Media Network(ITworld.com 5/10/2006)

Microsoft Sees Future as Media Network
ITworld.com 5/10/2006
James Lewin, ITworld.com
Last week, Microsoft quietly announced that it was planning to evolve from a software company into a media network.
People aren't exactly drooling to get the upcoming, delayed version of Windows. Apache recently put another nail in Microsoft's IIS by becoming the leading choice for secured web sites. Firefox looks like it could follow Apache, inexorably eating away at Microsoft's share of the browser market. Companies are deploying Linux servers as alternatives to not just Unix, but Windows. Organizations are even looking at alternatives to Office.
Microsoft's software business is siege...and it looks like the company's attention is moving elsewhere.
Give it Away; Give it Away; Give it Away, Now
Last week, Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer announced the launch of Microsoft adCenter. The announcement wasn't that exciting, by itself. Ballmer, however, made it clear that Microsoft isn't just updating its advertising service:
"Our close partnership with the ad community is extremely important to us as we evolve Microsoft from a software company into the world's largest, most attractive provider of online media through MSN, Windows Live and adCenter," said Ballmer. "Ad-supported software services are an integral part of Microsoft's plans to give consumers access to a broader variety of digital media, whenever they want and on whatever device they prefer."
According to Microsoft, adCenter is already serving 100 percent of paid search traffic on Microsoft's US sites. The company is also investing in Web analytics, with the goal of providing advertisers a one-stop-shop for buying ads that will be displayed while people check email, blog, use mobile devices, game and other Internet-based activities.
"Why does Microsoft care so much about the world that Google is the leader in?" asks Microsoft tech evangelist Robert Scoble. "The advertising industry is a lot bigger than the software industry. Translation: the MBA's here see a lot more growth potential in advertising-backed software than they do in software that you go to Fry's and buy."
Merril Lynch is predicting online ad spending to grow nearly 30% this year, to over $16 billion. That's just the tip of the advertising iceberg, too. Companies spend about 95% of their budgets offline, but are rapidly moving advertising dollars to the Web.
In other words, Microsoft sees that free services and content are where the money's at.
The Implications for Microsoft Web Software
If Microsoft is shifting its focus to being a media network, software like Internet Explorer and IIS, becomes less important to them. Many companies now view Microsoft-specific Web technologies, such as ActiveX, as liabilities and are moving to alternatives. As this happens, Microsoft's Web apps lose some of their selling points, and also their usefulness as tools for Microsoft.
These apps will probably survive to the extent that Microsoft can use them to promote their media network. IE is in decline, but is still used by most Web users. Expect IE's "innovations" to be hooks into Microsoft online services, like using the search function to drive traffic to MSN search.
On the other hand, apps that don't fit so well into this new vision of the company, like Internet Information Server, will probably continue to fade away.

Wednesday, May 10, 2006

Microsoft and Google Grapple for Supremacy as Stakes Escalate (5/10/06,NYTimes)

May 10, 2006
Microsoft and Google Grapple for Supremacy as Stakes Escalate
By STEVE LOHR
The Microsoft- Google rivalry is shaping up as a titanic corporate clash for the ages.
It may not turn out that way. Markets and corporate fortunes routinely defy prediction. But it sure looks as if the two companies are on a collision course, as the realms of desktop computing and Internet services and software overlap more and more.
Microsoft, of course, is the reigning powerhouse of computing and Google is the muscular Internet challenger. On each side, the battalions are arrayed: executives, engineers, marketers, lawyers and lobbyists. The spending and competition are escalating daily. For each, it seems, the other passes what Andrew S. Grove, a founder and former chairman of Intel, calls the "silver bullet test" of strategic competition. "If you had one bullet, who would you shoot with it?"
How the Microsoft-Google confrontation plays out could shape the future of competition in computing and how people use information technology.
Do the pitched corporate battles of the past shed any light on how this one might turn out?
Business historians and management experts say the experience in two of the defining industries of the 20th century, mass-market retailing and automobiles, may well be instructive. The winners certainly scored higher in the generic virtues of business management: innovation, execution and leadership.
But perhaps even more significant, those who came out on top, judging from history, had two more specific attributes. They were the companies, according to business historians, that proved able to adapt to change instead of being prisoners of past success. And in their glory days, these corporate champions were magnets for the best and brightest people.
"One area where Microsoft and Google are really competing head-to-head now is in the war for talent," said Richard S. Tedlow, a historian and professor at the Harvard Business School. "Historically, the company that won the war for talent, won the war."
Mr. Tedlow points to Montgomery Ward as a company that lost talented managers to its rival Sears, and then lost its way. The crucial defection, Mr. Tedlow said, was Robert E. Wood, a former Army general who joined Montgomery Ward in 1919 as a general merchandise manager.
Even in the Army, Mr. Wood was a close reader of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the Census Bureau's annual tracking of social and economic conditions. Mr. Wood became convinced that America was at the beginning of a huge population shift from rural regions to urban areas.
That meant, he understood, that the mail-order giants like Montgomery Ward and Sears needed to move from being catalog retailers serving a dispersed market to department store merchants with stores in city and suburban population centers.
Sears, as a company, grasped that fundamental change in the marketplace in a way that initially Montgomery Ward did not, Mr. Tedlow said.
In 1924, Mr. Wood left Montgomery Ward to join Sears, and he later recruited others. In 1945, Mr. Wood, then the chairman of Sears, made another smart call on economic trends. The postwar years, he decided, would bring a long expansion, as pent-up consumer demand from the war years was unleashed.
So Sears embarked on a national store-building binge. His counterpart at Montgomery Ward, Sewell Avery, made the opposite bet, keeping money in the bank to prepare the company for a postwar depression, which he was convinced was around the corner.
Over the next several years, sales at Sears doubled, while Montgomery Ward's shrank 10 percent. "Losing Robert Wood was catastrophic to Ward," Mr. Tedlow observed.
In its recruiting face-offs against Google, Microsoft insists that it fares quite well over all. But there have been some high-profile defections of leading engineers, who said they preferred Google's technological direction and corporate culture.
The most prominent was Kai-Fu Lee, a stellar computer scientist and manager. Mr. Lee not only established Microsoft's research labs in China, but he is also an expert in areas like natural language and speech-recognition technologies — important ingredients to Internet search today and to the way people will interact with computers in the future.
Last year, when Mr. Lee left Microsoft, it sued Google and Mr. Lee. Microsoft claimed, under a Washington state law, that Mr. Lee violated a noncompete clause in his employment contract and misused inside information in going to work for Google. The suit was settled last December.
"What does it say about a company when it sues when someone leaves?" Mr. Tedlow asked. "It makes Microsoft sound like a prison."
In business, forever tends to last about five years, a decade or two at most. So Sears prospered for a time and celebrated its success by building the Sears Tower in Chicago in the 1970's. Yet even from a height of 110 stories, Sears failed to see Wal-Mart coming. Wal-Mart brought the next revolution in retailing with its shrewd use of computer technology to track buying trends and orchestrate suppliers to become a hyper-efficient, low-cost merchant.
The auto industry presents a sobering history of past-success syndrome. The Model T, introduced by Henry Ford in 1908, famously made the automobile affordable, helped along by his pioneering assembly-line production, which started in 1913. Ford's laserlike focus on efficiency drove the cost of a Model T from $850 when it was introduced down to $275 by the early 1920's.
But cost and efficiency was all he focused on. The design was not updated, the color selection remained black and only black. Eventually, the single-mindedness caught up with the company. In 1925, the Ford share of the American market had fallen to 45 percent, from 57 percent two years earlier. By then, Alfred P. Sloan Jr., the managerial maestro of Detroit, was president of General Motors and its sales were surging.
"Henry Ford was so in love with his brilliant idea that he refused to change," said John Steele Gordon, a historian and author of "The Business of America" (Walker, 2001).
General Motors was well on its way to becoming the world's largest carmaker. Yet as early as the 1950's, the Japanese challenge to Detroit's auto supremacy was quietly getting under way. The architect of the Japanese ascent was a production engineer, Taiichi Ohno, who worked at Toyota. In 1950, Toyota manufactured 13,000 cars, barely a day's production for G.M.
Mr. Ohno had to devise an efficient way to manufacture a variety of cars in small production runs. He turned that adversity into an advantage, using rapid tooling changes, constant quality improvements and just-in-time parts delivery to steadily improve the cars.
Once again, the corporate giant was complacent, and late to see a fundamental shift in its industry.
"G.M. did not take Toyota and the Japanese seriously until the 1980's," said Michael A. Cusumano, a professor at the Sloan School of Management of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and author of "The Japanese Automobile Industry" (Harvard University Press, 1986). "By then it was really too late."
History, then, suggests that past success is often an anchor holding a company back, and that Microsoft is at risk from the Google challenge. "The wind is really behind Google, and Microsoft's main tool for navigating the future is the rear view mirror," said Paul Saffo, a director of the Institute for the Future, a forecasting consultancy in Silicon Valley.
Microsoft bristles at being cast as a laggard. In a meeting last week with online advertisers and reporters, Bill Gates, the Microsoft chairman, portrayed his company as a force for healthy competition in Internet search. "We will keep them honest," Mr. Gates said of Google. And he vowed to catch up. "I think this is a rare case where we are being underestimated," he said. Microsoft certainly has plenty of money to finance any competitive foray, with $35 billion in cash, while Google has about $8 billion.
Indeed, the incumbent-challenger narrative — which portrays the incumbent as an endangered species — may not apply this time. Microsoft has adapted nimbly to big challenges before.
Apple introduced point-and-click graphical computing with the Macintosh in 1984, but Microsoft caught up and became dominant on the desktop with Windows.
In the mid-1990's, Netscape Communications posed a threat because the Internet browser might undermine the importance of Windows. Microsoft came up with its own browser and rebuffed that challenge, partly with tactics that violated antitrust laws, a federal appeals court ruled.
"Microsoft has responded every time in the past," said Mr. Cusumano, who is also the author of two books on Microsoft.
Now comes Google. It is offering or developing as free Web-based services e-mail, word processing and other programs that could replace Microsoft desktop programs and eat into Microsoft's lucrative software business. But that is by no means certain.
Google is cagey about its strategy. When Netscape was flying high, some of its executives talked of making Microsoft irrelevant — a strategic blunder, according to Silicon Valley lore.
Google's chief executive, Eric E. Schmidt, is a veteran of past battles with Microsoft, and he has no intention of making the same misstep. He speaks mainly of Google's limitless potential and ambitions, embellished by intriguing remarks like the one recently that Google is "building the systems and infrastructure of a global $100 billion company," many times its current yearly revenue. Some clues about Google's plans could emerge today, when its executives hold an annual media day at its Silicon Valley headquarters. Google now makes virtually all its money by selling advertisements linked to its enormously popular Internet search service. Microsoft and Yahoo are desperately trying to close the gap with Google, the Internet search and ad sales titan.
If Google stumbles, it will be seen as the company unable to move beyond a single stellar success.
Since the future is so often the pattern of the past with some twist, what is the expert view? "I'm a historian," said Mr. Tedlow of Harvard. "Ask me in 10 years and I'll tell you why what happened was inevitable."

Tuesday, May 02, 2006

CEO的表現與薪酬是否速配? 評比方式與獎勵標準的共識待建立(電子時報, 05/02/06)

進言集-CEO的表現與薪酬是否速配? 評比方式與獎勵標準的共識待建立
(作者魏東陽/台北)
2006/05/02

 美國富比士雜誌評選全美最差的5位執行長,其中不乏電子業。這項評選或許改變不了太多的現實,至少評選本身及其結果,對於一些只享治理公司權力、但尸位素餐或無能無德的企業領導人,不啻提供了一根棍棒。雖然媒體無法直接有貢獻,但如透過類似評比的功能,還是可以間接促進公司治理的進步。 2001年以降,美國社會在網通泡沫破裂後,有股不平之鳴:大企業的執行長(CEO)不僅領的薪水高,股票等報酬更是嚇人,甚至連下台(不一定是退休)時的報酬,也不斷創下歷史新高。
公司章程中空白的CEO薪酬 做為一個企業最有權勢及享受最多資源與福利的CEO,能否為企業創造價值,所創造的價價有多少可以或應該做為他或她的報償,才算合理?企業是民營機構,政府不宜出面以法律規定,必須由企業的代議機關即董事會或最高權力的股東會決定與行使,法律上稱為公司章程,但絕大多數企業選擇空白。 從企業史與公司法的精神來看,理想的企業權力行使,在絕大多數無法落實。原因不外企業內部政治的運作,董事會結構的先天缺陷,能達到接近公司法理想境界的企業,清一色都是CEO具備高瞻遠矚的特質。 CEO究竟該拿多少薪資,領多少報償?各行各業不一樣,企業規模不同,景氣階段也不一樣,是CEO總薪酬不能一概而論的原因。至於CEO是否是企業家族的成員,甚至企業的創立者,或是專業經理人,更是構成差異的重大因素。 不管造成差異的因素有多少,CEO的表現則比較容易評估,也就是由結果或成績單來評估。這個成績單所需列出的考評要項不必太多,而且可以運用加權方式打出分數,雖然評估永遠都可能有些小瑕疪,但考評者提出合理的評估標準與被考評者對考評標準有合理的期待,基本上就構成公平與公義的要件,股東沒有什麼話好說,CEO也不會沾惹出八掛、傳言。 績效應與報酬對應 想要做這項評比,首先當然是要有資料。台灣企業,因為缺乏客觀的評比與歷史資料,我們很難立即做出結論。不過,最近幾年來,證券主管機關已經開始要求股票上市櫃公司必須揭露高階主管薪酬資料,多少對於過去可能毫無章法的薪酬制,提供一些參考與評比的價值。這是件好事,但還不夠好,因為政府僅能要求揭露資訊,但無法置喙,企業要做得更好,得靠董事會及會嚷嚷的股東。 第二步就是匯整資料,建檔並追蹤。接下來就是找出評比的標準,最主要的就是CEO為企業帶來或創造多少價值。這裡開始,會面臨很多爭議,主要是數字或非數字的計算方式,不管是否可以計算,標準都很難無懈可擊。對企業來說,是一種挑戰,而是否願意接受這種挑戰,大致可以反推出企業是否具備永續經營,或是具有真正朝願景邁進的企圖心。 CEO表現評比標準及應得的薪酬容易引起爭議,因此不宜由董事長或CEO自行決定,目前較妥當的做法,應在董事會內成立薪酬委員會,或者董事會下設審計委員會負責,委員最好都具備獨立董事身份,做為與執行者之間的防火牆。 企業設立薪酬委員會或審計委員會,是否就可解決上述問題?答案是否定的。 實務上,企業內部的權力結構,權力運作與畫分,都還是涉及企業內政治與人際關係的問題,之間的運作微妙與不透明之處太多,還是要看最後的成果而定。 市場是最後的審判長 簡單地說,不管有沒有設立所謂的監督或監理機制,企業的市場價值是否提升,仍可做為該機制是否有效執行,或是企業虛應故事的判定標準。亦即,委員會是企業採取主動機制的第一步,市場才是最終的審判者。企業董事會如果做假,可以混過市場於一時,但不會得逞太久。 最近,台積電對外宣示,有意廢除監察人,改以審計委員會取代。此舉是否畫蛇添足?或是故做聰明、嘩眾取寵?相信沒有人會有一絲負面的想法。為何?從張大帥過去為台積電創造的價值,以及該公司寫下的優異誠信紀錄看,沒有人會懷疑台積電不是認真的。 對於CEO的表現與薪酬是否速配,有一點是很難判定的,即短期間內的成績,有可能是做假的結果。美國恩隆案及數不清的CEO弊案,最能證明這點。 股票選擇權宜分年分批給 筆者提供一個意見。CEO的薪資可視企業規模、產業變遷速度、管理幅度做基礎,提供維持符合其身份水準的日常必要開支及適當比例的儲蓄額,更大比例的報酬,用股票選擇權支應,而且分年提供。這種方式,其實與很多非CEO級的高階主管相同,為何CEO在薪資上應享有特別多的特有利益?就算有,這個部分應盡可能的從股票選擇權上,得到補償。選擇權能否兌現?能兌現多少?完全視CEO能為企業創造多少價值而定。創造的價值愈多,CEO在股票選擇權上獲利愈豐;反之,沒有價值,就是一種重大懲罰。 這種方式,與投資或風險的觀念相同。薪資視為固定收益,風險有險;股票選擇權則是高風險的資產,風險愈高,CEO才會愈謹慎小心,或更加努力地設法讓其能兌現。兩者之間,有槓桿作用,薪資給的太高,股票選擇權能否兌現的風險,相對變得較低。風險愈低,怠惰或採行輕率的舉動就愈高。 分年分批,譬如說3或5年,提供可兌現的股票選擇權,主要是要讓CEO平衡企業長中短期的利益,而不是一次性地提領獎金。一次性提領巨額獎勵,提供CEO短期做假帳的動機,忽略永續經營的重要性。據說,台灣電子業前3大之一的企業,就是利用這種方式提供員工股票的。過去,很多科技公司員工跳槽的時機,就是在領到股票之後,跟公司說拜拜的。 昇陽CEO被轟有理 最後,CEO的薪酬究竟與企業的表現有沒有直接關係?學者的研究似乎是相關性不高。如果這是真的,那麼董事會提CEO高薪酬的動機與決定,就有問題的。如果動機與決定有問題,股東可否向董事會求償?以昇陽(Sun)CEO的例子來說,6年拿8,000萬美元薪酬,公司市價卻減少到不及1成,被人攻擊也就不足為奇了。 本週是1年之內最重要的1週,上市櫃公司必須發布2005年與2006年第一季的財報,也就是營運成績單。不僅是投資人,就是企業的幹部與員工,也應該看看各位的企業表現如何,再上網查查公司CEO與董事長、董監事的薪酬,你就可以知道投資或工作的公司,是否值得信賴。(作者曾任經濟日報資深記者、電子時報副社長,本文言論不代表電子時報立場)